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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE TREATISE 
PRELIMINARY NOTE 
Acarya. Dignaga takes for granted the graspmg by 
the mind of its object through process of assuming its 
form, i.e. SiJrupya" co-ordination between the subject (mind) 
and its object. This theory has served the author as a main 
weapon to dismiss the reality of external world in this treatise. 
Now we have to find out who pleaded for reality of 
our objective universe and who propounded the said co-ordina-
tion-theory. The early Buddhists though they are realists, 
never pleaded for the theory. V. the latest champion of the 
school Bhadanta Subhagupta and his treatise Bahyartha-
Siddhi- kadkii in this Bulletin, in 1967. Later Buddhists like 
Sautrantikas on the other hand have adopted freely the 
theory for their real1stic approach to the universe, cfr. my 
Ba. Siddhi with Notes. But they were not original propou-
nders of the theory. 
It appears, therefore, that the Sankhya-yoga-masters were 
the first to draw attention to the ever-occuring phenomenon 
of co-ordination between the mind or intelle,::t and its object. 
The idea will be made clear in the following statements 
of Patanjali, the author of the yoga sutras : yoga is an 
absolute check of Uitta- Vlffi; then at that time the soul 
remains in hie;; own form. In the other states the soul IS 
assimilated with Vrttis (mind's functions). Vrttis are five in aU; 
they are: sensible experience, its reverse, empty thought, sleep 
and memory. Sensible experiences are: perception, inference 
and scd pture, these 3 Pramanas. Reverse is a wrong knowledge 
founded on an absent object, e.g. knowledge of a silver piece 
on the shell, vain thought is devoid of the object o,:;curlng in 
pursuit of the word-meaning. S1ecp is a metamorpho~is of the 
mind having as the object the ide]. of non-existen·::;e (abhava~ 
prayyaya-alambanrJ, ~'Ol'fGf<;f~l:tm~o/IT) The absolute check of these 
Vrttis are secured by means of constant efforts and 
desirelessness.(yoga sutras, I, 2-12) 
Of these statements the most relevant to our purpose is 
the 4 tho Sutra which states that the soul in other states assumes 
the forms of the experienced things, i.e. Vrtti-Sarupya' Other 
Slates' -when the man is engaged in pursuit of the world acti-
vity. The following is another noteworthy statement: 
An entity becomes known or unknown to the mind because 
the mind acquires the image of the entity reflected in itself 
(IV, 17). 
All the metamorphoses are known to the soul (Puru~a) 
because he has no transformation of any kind, 3fq-f~rfqc'f v. IV, 
18. 
On the sankhya side the author of the Karika, isvara-
krsna does not speak much of the Sartlpya-theory, however 
the anonymous commentary, yuktidipik:t refers to it more than 
once. He explains vrtti as fqqllt:;nt~'lf"{tJfrqTRq:;nT, 'a transformation 
in the shape of its content' (v. pp. 103, 112-114). More interes-
ting is its citation of two verses from an ancient author on p. 
80: 
Just as the intellect appears as if it is of the form of an 
object (3f~l<trr~ ~,,) just so the soul being brightened by the 
intellect (~;[lfr an'iftz:rqr;:r:) is said to be intelligent, (boddha) 
like a jewel (ma:r:ti). Whichever is the mind's act, i.e. metamor-
phosis, the soul, Puru~a, also assumes all such forms of the 
intellect which forms pertain to other than the self because he 
is conscious \ ~nii.) 
Ample advantage of Sarfipya vada has been taken by the 
Advaita Vedantins in expounding their epistemology of perce-
ption. Refer to the Vedanta Paribha~a of Dharmaraja Ch. I. 
pp. 13, 18: 
"Just as the water of a tank, going out through 
a hole and entering the field through channels comes 
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to have even like those fields, a quadrangular or other 
figure, similarly, the internal organ too which is of the 
nature of light going out through the sense of sight, etc. and 
reaching to the locality of contents like pot, is modified in the 
form of contents like the pot. This same modification is called 
psychosis, vrtti v. the text edited and translated by S.S.Surya-
narayana Sastri, Adyar Library series, Adyar 1942. 
Sri Sankaracharya has also accepted Jfiana as sakara, 
endowed with the form of its content, v. for example the 
Gitabhasya, p. 446 of Gita Press edn. ad XVIII, 50. 
The above citations would amply prove that the sarupya-
vada was originally expounded by the Brahmanical writers, 
and then it was grafted on to Buddhism by the Yogacara-Budd-
hists in order to estahlish th~ir Idt'alistic Philosophy. v. My 
Bah. Siddhi, Notes: 151, 162, 165, 168-9 170, 183, e~('. and my 
paper on Idealistic Buddhism in th~ Journal of Tirupati 
Research Institute, Vo1. I pt. 3. 
Now let us turn to the topics of the treatise. 
The author, Acarya Djgnaga in the first part of his trea-
tise, i.e. Aphorisms 1-5, sets up the views of the Realists who 
,consider the objectivfl universe in the external as absolutely 
real in one form or other which the author proves to be some-
thing imaginary. In the second part the author's own opinion 
about the issue is presented. This is a convenient method of 
treatment generally adopted in the ancient India Scientific 
Tff~atises. The method goes under the heading: Purwpak~a and 
Siddhanta or Anya-Sam,ay(1, and 81Ja-8amay'1, others' view and 
own view (cp. Vinitadeva's Tika. ad 6. Introductory). 
According to the author the Realists may broadly be 
classified under three groups as follows: 
1. The advocates of atoms as direct objects of our consci-
ousness. 
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2. The 8QVOcates of the combined atoms acting as before. 
3. The advocates of the atomic integrated forms behav-
mg so. 
As to the problem of the identifications of these 
philosophers, the first group may be taken for certain to 
be the early Buddhists like the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasikas on 
the authority of Vasubandhu, Subhagupta and others. As 
to the second group we have no means to ascertain who 
they are except the well -known Chinese commentator Kue-
Chi who reveals them to the authors of the Sutra-sect, perha-
ps the Sautrantikas. The advocacy of the third proposition 
is attributed to Vagbhata, etc. by Vinitad!va and to San-
.,ghabhadra and his followers by Kue-Chi. 
Vasubandhu also speaks of three opinions on the , 
external objects: 1) The first opinon pleads that the 
Object of our cognition is one whole, (w'lyavin (like the pot, 
etc.); 2) the second one holds it to be many separate elements 
i.e. atoms and 3) the third view is: it is a totality of atoms 
(Sainghnta) The fir£t opinion is mentioned there as th~t 
of the Vaise?ika masters. The advocates of the second and 
the third view are not stated there. We may, however, surmise 
that they are the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasika~ from the context. 
Though the simple atoms do not get combined as they 
are partles5, the molecules of atoms can get combined. 
So say the Kasmira Vaibhasikas (Vimsika, ad. 13th. ver.) 
REALISTS 
1. The Buddhist Realists declare: The atoms are truly 
objects of the sensory consciousness, because they ure the rea] 
cause of that consciousness. 
Dignaga replies: They are not its object, because the 
atoms are not cognized directly (lit. not reflected in it); 
example: the sense organ. (Though it causes conci(jJU5n~5iS, 
4 
it is not, at all,· cognized by it). Vasubandhu's answer to 
them is very simple, viz. the atoms are not proved to be 
real entities, (prJ,rfJ,rnrirpul) nn siddhyati). 
The reason for Dignaga's complex answer is that he 
assumes two criteria for jUdging rllambana, (object-cause), 
viz. 1) causality and 2) image-imposing (akara-arpaJ?,a). Of 
these two the first criterion has been accepted by aU sch-
ools of Buddhism and it is brought under the category 
of the four conditions: helu, samananlfLra, alambarul and 
adhipati (Abh. Kosa, II, 62, Madh. Sastra I. 2. etc.) The 
import of causality is well kept in view in the usage of 
the term in the fonowing contexts: The visible dis.::harges 
the function of dlnmbrlnn towards the visual consciousness 
(:q&1f.r~r"~lf liq-l1r\'11="!,;;~ q;~)f<r I) Salis. Sutra, p. 15,1.4). Alambana 
is a thing by support of which consciousness arises, that 
is to say, a supporting element in the pro·:ess of cogni-
tion i~ iilambnna (Madh. AvaUira, my Skt. t;!xt. p. 77). 
SamfFta- is taking up of cuntent and nimittrt, content 
(visayn) is the same as (ilambana. nimittlJ, is particulars of 
the same, i.e. blue, yellow and othe;s and th~ factor of 
their determination (Trimsik/ibhawa, p. 21 & 23). The 
Satya-Siddhi also equates dZ,l.mbruu.L with nimitta (ch. 77: 
f.,f'l:'iiT\'11="!';:{ fq:ffrrrl!, 1 cpo ch. 191). What is prodll::tiv~ of 
knowledge is tilambanl1, (Slokavartika, p. 285:~~-qr1{ii~<l:rr\'11="!,~ 
if~ql!, I) The cause is the same as Jl,tmbana (Umbeka in 
Slokavartika-tatparyatika, p. 278). Dharmakirti also confirms 
this idea: "Causality is no other than objectivity" pra. 
var. II, 234: The object is what is a causal entity" Ibid. 
246. "A non-cause is non~obje,:.:t" Ibid, 257. It is also 
noteworthy that Dignaga himself cites a sastra in his 
comment on Aphorism 2 to stre ss the causality a main 
part of alambana. There is no mention of the other parts 
image-evoking, which omission Vinitadeva justifies by saying 
that this image-evoking is accepted in this system [of the 
Sautrantikas] v. his Tika, pp95below. 
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Now we may be sure that the above said second 
criterion of alambana viz. image-imposing is a new element 
introduced by Dignaga under the dominant influence of 
the Sautrantika Reali5ts who hold sway in the field of 
epistemology of the Buddhists. Since the early Buddhists 
could not conceive of the image or no-image of a knowledge, 
they hold that the atoms become a direct obje,;::t of the 
sensory consciousness. The atoms are very subtle and 
invisible; how can they be admitted as a direct object? 
Bhadanta Subhagupta, a latest champion of the school 
provides a fitting answer. It is as follows:-
An atom which may manifest its own single knowledge 
cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When 
it appears asso,;::iated with other atoms it looses its atomic 
form; how then could ea.-:h of them appear in our know-
ledge? (VaL 43) Atoms cannot each individually and inde-
pendently appear in life and this is also the reas r)t1 why 
each of the atoms never flashes out in our conciousness (44). 
The atoms though they are mutually un-related and devoid 
of parts nevertheless become integrated and accomplish 
the gross things like the globe of parth and others (56) ... 
The. person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a 
mountain and such other places could count the at )m:i 
with their number and other distinction (59). Therefore it 
is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all 
exist ...... (60). Refer to the Bahyarthd Siddhi in the Bulletin 
of Tibetology, Ganglokl 1967 for further details. 
The Vaibhasikas appear to hold the view that the 
atoms are not perceptible to us. They nevertheless form 
the knowledge-object because they are basically the cause 
of knowledge. A Digambara Jaina, Sumati by name is 
also credited to maintain the atoms as direct object (v. 
our remarks below on the third proposition). There are 
two opinions about the atoms' behaviour: 1) they exist 
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allowing some inter space III their midst and 2) they re-
ma.in without any intermediate space (n ~F:f<:r: '1<:QT!lf<r: 
~) fip::~cf'n: '1HT!lf<r: I ). The atoms of no interspace have 
been reciprocal support and are united. Vasubandhu in 
his Kosa says that the Kasmira Vaibhasikas advocate the 
atoms as having some inter space and remaining in a 
close vicinity ( ~Fa<:r:Cf"'n!lf<r: ) but do not get combined; and that 
Bhadanta, (a Sautrantika master) asserts that the atoms remain 
with no interspace and due to this they are termed combined 
( fi{~(!'~ ~~'llSc~~r) He prefers this Bhadanta's opinion (~i'(f1=Rf 
"l!ilSC'o<nl, r) Kosavyakhya. I, p. 99, 3). See also my discussion on 
this topic in the Abh. Problem, Br. V.idya, XVIII, p. 226f. Th~re 
is one more opinion holding the combined atoms as obje·:;t-
cause. (See Tattva. s. paiijika, p. 556, and Haribhadra's 
Abhs. aloka, pp. 372-74). This is probably the opinion 
of the Sautrantikas, see discussion below. 
Dignaga elucidates his meaning of" the content"· (vi:;aya) 
thu~: "A content is that whose characteristiGs are specified 
by the knowledge; this is so because the knowledge appears 
in the form of content. The atoms cannot behave like that 
hen ce not object. " 
2. Then let us take the combined atoms as object. The 
author demurs to it: "Consciousness does not arise from 
what is represented in it, (i.e. combined atoms do not cause 
the consciousness) because they do not exist in substance 
like the double moon." For the combined atoms are 
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not, in fact, different from the simple ones. 
Vasubandhu's reply to this proposition is also simple. 
No atom is proved to be real (pararnanuh na Siddhyati). 
The author further makes his standpoint plain thus: 
"What object evokes the cons,eiousness endowed with its 
own image, that is properly regarded as actual object of 
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that consciousness: because that alone is spoken of duly 
as the productive cause of the consciousness. But the 
aggregates of atoms are not so. (Le. productive cause). 
Example, double moon, it is perceived on account of one's 
own defe,:tive eye. Its perception is' not caused by the 
double moon, as there exists no object like the double 
moon. Similar are the aggregates of atoms." 
This proposition, according to Kue-Chi comes from 
theSutra-sect, i.e. Sautrantikas; but this finding is not 
corroborated by any other source. We have, however, 
enough quotations pleading for the aggregate of atoms to 
be object-cause. Kue-Chi clarifies their views thus: The 
indivisible atoms that are substantially existing are not the 
object of the five-fold consciousness because no indivisible 
atoms are manifested in it. These seven indivisible atoms 
constitute jointly one ar}udipa, a gross atom. This gross 
body of atoms though phenomenally true is the object of 
the five-fold consciousness, because there this gross form is 
reflected ......... "(see p. below). This opinion of gross 
body of atoms joining together is also referred to as it is 
pleaded by the Kasmira Vaibhasikas in the Vimsatika ad 
13. The characteristic of this opinion is that the gross 
body of atoms though it phenomenally true has been 
accepted as the object of consciousness. It is obvious that in 
this proposition the second criterion of dlambanu" i.e. image-
imposing has been much stressed and preferred. This is 
confirmed by the statement of the Pramanavartikavrtti p. 230: 
arT~r{r!fvr~<f fql'i'l~!R1lll{ I "The characteristic of a content is its 
capacity of imposing image." Note als') Pra. varlika, II, 
224: The Knowledge in what form appears, that f(}rm is 
spoken of as graspable of that knowledge «(f~ "!f;Q~Tlifin:r 
ffflfT~~~r~'if'1~ I) The graspable here is multitude of atoms, 
(anu-sancaya-vrtti.) This is the reason for citing an 
earlier authority to the effect that the causality is equally 
an important ingredient of alamba1la (v. Tika on p. 91 ) 
Dignaga's objection stands on the ground that the 
aggregates of atoms are phenomenally true, hence cannot 
serve as the ubject-cause. This objection is dispelled by 
Dharmakirti in these sayings: The same self-characteristic 
()f things (8vlllaksav-u) is the ultimate substance (dravya sat) 
because the substantial thil)g is that which is capable of 
discharging a purposive ac~ion (Nyayabindu, I, 14-15). We 
should remember that the 'above sayings are rvade from 
the SautrantiK'as' point of view. The idea of iRtegrated 
atom, Samcita-ap,u is also upheld by SUbhagupta on the 
same pattern of argument: "The atoms being integrated 
discharge a uniform function and are termed Sattcita, 
'integrated' and to the upholder of this opinion how are 
the atoms non-substance, adravya? (Bah. Siddhi ver. 39). 
Dharmakirti also justifies this proposition in these sayings: 
"The effect is caused by several things; yet what (know-
ledge) arises imitating what form, that form is regarded 
as "grasped" by that knowledge" (Pr. var. II, 248). All 
knowledge flashes out from its contents, the knowledge 
though caused by others (like the sense, etc.) assumes the 
form of its content only, (but not of the sense-organ)" 
Ibid. 268. 
The following citations would enable us to have a 
glimpse of how the advocates of the combined atoms as 
knowledge-content meet difficulties in their way:-
s 
Integration, multitude, homogeneity (are synonyms); 
the sensory consciousness is related to it. The sense of 
homogeneity (siittui:nya) is necessarily geared up with discri-
minative knowledge. Pra. VAr. II, 194. comment: The five 
consciousness-bodies are of integrated iilambana; this is the 
conclusion, siddJuinta. It is also stated (in Pra. Samuccaya) 
the perception as it is effected from more than one thing 
is focused on the homogeneity (Samanya-gocararas its own 
content. Thus the multitude of atoms is termed Sa'ltcita, 
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'integrated'; the same is thought of as sama,nya; the sen-
sory knowledge is centered upon it. . The sense of 8amanya 
is f<"llowed by a discriminative knowledge; how could it be 
then a discrimination-free perception? So the author says: 
"The atoms are formed in co-ordinati0l} with other atoms, 
then they are named sancita "integrated" and serve as nimitta, 
object-cause of the knowledge-rise." The so formed integ-
rated atoms arc meant in the saying: The five conscious-
nes s-bodies are of integrated ala,mbana. That they serve 
as nimttta,' caUse of the knowledge-rise is meant in the 
saying because "it is effected' from mor3 than one thing." 
Such distinction of atoms is not possib~e in ,the absence 
of other atoms; the same (kn'owledge) is not fixed in a 
single atom, the knowledge is said as focused on samanya. 
(Pr. Var. II, 196). Comment: The distinction of atoms, 
is their capacity of evoking knowledge. The individual 
atoms are imperceptible, but they, being combi,ned, become 
perceptible. Therefore, since the knowledge is not invariable 
with a single atom it is said by the truth-speaker (Dignaga) 
that knowledge is focused on the S(Unfi,nya, that is the 
knowledge has as its content the multitude of atoms 
(pamma1!u-sangh?it(J-vi,~a/la). But, it is not to mean that 
knowledge is focused on Samanya, generality other than 
the 'atoms. Then how can the objection of the perception be-
coming a discrimination-haunted be raised on pretext that 
the perception is focused on the generality? cpo The same 
idea is stressed in the Chap. I, 88-90. 
The above statement of Dharmakirti in his Pra. Vartika 
makes obvious that Dignaga is explaining that- the com-
bined atoms evoke a pure perceptive knowledge by saying: 
~Tffi~m~ ~T<f Ufl1T<=!11TT'9~: I 
This fact admirably tallies with an accepted truth that 
Dignaga propounded his logical theories on the basis of the 
Sautrantikas' metaphysics. But here in this present treatise 
Dignaga's attitude is quite different and unfavourable to the 
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tbeory of Sanghiltrilarnbanll, (combined-atom-obje·;t); hence 
he puts it under the category of his opponents' views. 
3. Then the author takes up to examine the third proposi-
tion. " Some masters say that the integrated form of atoms is 
the cause of. consciousness." Dignaga replies that the atomic 
form does not become its object, e.g. its solidity, etc. and 
so on. 
The advocates of this proposition are In the opmlOn 
of Vinitadeva: Vagbhata and others which opinion 
is not corroborated by any other source. However, Kue-
Chi a~cribes it to the Nco-Sarvastiv:ldins, ,; Banghabhadra, 
etc. The material elements, they maintain, (r'fipadayo dharrna) 
. have .each of them many a form (aK'ara) but of these only 
one .part becomes the object of perception. Tp.erefo,re, 
indivisible atoms, being in co-operation with one another 
assume each an integrated form, 8oncit(J-iikara. This form 
being in substance produces the consciousness which resembles 
that form and hence becomes the object -cause (aiambana) 
of the five~fold consciousness. (v.p. more details below). 
There is some anachronism here. Dignaga criticises 
the Neo:...Sarvastivadin. without namil1g him and the Neo-
Sarvastivadin dispels the criticism naming Dignaga according 
to Kue-Chi. We must guess that 'they must either contem-
porary of Dignaga or Dignaga sp~eaks of some earlier spokes-
man of the school. It. is,. also interesting to observe here 
that Dignaga ridicules the Sanghata-vada, (second proposition 
in this treatise) for which he pleaded in his' standard work, 
Pramana-Samuccaya (see Dharmakirti's cOrrlment on p. 
above). These circumstances may su~ge~i that Dignaga 
must have turned an arch-idealist in a later period of his Ii fe 
as his predece.r;;'Jor Vasubandhu did according t~ the traditio,n. 
While composing the Pramana-Samuccaya the author should 
be a neutral logician as he pleads for the both systems of the 
Sautrantikas as well as the yogacaras. cfr. inyBud.· Idealism 
in journal, S:V. Institute, VoL I, 3, pp. 71ff. 
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KamalasiIa informs us that the above said third 
proposition was also advocated by a Digambara Jaina, Sum-
ati by name. His plea is this; Atoms are two ·fold viz. of 
common form and uncommon form in the pattern of all 
things having a general as wen as a particular self. Of the 
two, the common form of atoms is cognized by the senses 
and their uncommon one never cognized. Thus the cons-
ciousness in a uniform pattern as related to the atoms never 
comes into clash; hence the atoms are accomplished as per-
ceptible. (Tattva. pafijika, p. 554). 
Dignaga's reply to it is :"The atomic integrated form 
is not perceivable like solidity (i. e. hardness.) etc. Though 
they are in the atoms are not perceived by our eye-cons-
ciousness. So is the atomic integrated form." The author's 
weighty argument here is: "AU gross things like pot, bowl, 
etc. would be seen in a identical shape if the integrated form 
and the atomic form are one and the same. Of course there are 
differenciations in their sizps, but they are related to things 
which are only phenomenal entities and which cannot be regarded 
as causal factors. For, if we eliminate atoms of the empirical 
things one by one, we shall have no more the experience of such 
things. What is substantially true and existent never ceases 
t~ evoke its perception; for example, colour and other ato-
m,s. They never cease to catch up our senses." 
In this argument the author throws a sidelight on 
the latest phase of the Buddhist theory of matter as ad-
umbrated in the Satya-Siddhi. According to this theory 
the so-called qualities, colour, taste, odour and touchal are 
fundamental elements and all other four elements, earth 
etc. are formed out of the former four. Read S. Siddhi 
chs. 36,38-40 and cfr. in my Dvdasamukha, p. 53,n.105. 
4. Now the author set forth his own solution of the 
problem: "It is the content (artha) which exists internally 
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In the knowledge as a knowable aspect appearing to us 
as if it exists externally. Because. the content is essentially 
in the nature of consciousness and because it acts a pro-
ductive condition (to the consciousness) the knowable as-
pect is the object". 
The knowable aspect and the knowledge ~re one and 
designated differently. How can the principle of cause-
and-effect relation be admitted between them? The author 
answers: "Though it is only a part of the consciousness, 
it becomes a productive factor of the latter because it is' 
invariably and simultaneously associated with the latter; or 
it becomes so in succession by transmitting its force (Sakti)." 
In support of these two answers Dignaga cites the autho-
rity of his earlier Rationalists' sayirig: "In the presence 
of cause is the presence of its result and in the absence 
of cause is the absence of its result: this is the characte-
ristic sign of what is the cause and what is the result 
even if they happen simultaneous or in succession." This 
saying proves beyond doubt that there is possibly a cause-
effect-relation between the two simultaneous events if there 
is concomitance between them. This relation. can be des-
cribed as Sahabhu-hetu, co-existing cause (n the Sarvasti-
vadin's terminology. This causal relation . of simultaneity 
(Sahabhu) is applicable to the phenomenon of the mind and 
mental state, [citta-caitasika] that are appearing together. 
This relation also holds good in the case of four fundamen-
tal aDd four secondary elements (bhuta-bhautikaj which are 
mutually inseparable and conditoned~ A favourable exam-
ple cited here is pradipu:-prablui> lamp and light. They 
appear together and disappear together, hence they 
are mutually conditioned under the lavy of simultaneity 
(v. Kosavya, Cal. edn, II, p. 123) conception of Buddhism, 
p. 25, Abh. Sangaha, Koyambi edn, VIII, 22). 
This pattern of argument of the Sarvastivadin is not 
accepted by a more rational school of Buddhism, like the 
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Satya-siddhi which disproves both' the reason and the exam-
ple iJ:l ch. 36 and 40. Item 1, etc. The Brahmanical, 
logicians like KumArila also ridicule the causal relation 
between the co-existing events aljd its example. Kumarila's 
criticism of Dignaga's proposition is summed below along 
with his commentator, Parthasarathi Misra's remarks:-
4 
Let not the past be graspable as the Vaibhasikas 
assume. It may then be possible that between two knowled-
ges that are occuring simultaneous one is the graspable 
and the other grasper; therefore the following is stated: 
With reference to the two simultaneous events there will 
be no possibility of asserting one is proof and the other 
is proved (mana-meya) for the reason that two simultan-
eous events are mutually independent, and that there is a 
lack of action and actor. Causality in your system 
is graspable; in between the two independent events there 
is no cause-and-effect-relation, hence no idea of one is 
graspable and the other grasper (see Slokavartika, p. 309): 
Halloo, . (we have accepted that) the characteristic of the 
cause-and-effect-relation is nothing but invariable concomi-
tance " of Talbhliva-bhtivin, presence of effect on the pre-
sence of cause; this characteristic is obtainable in the case 
of two simultaneous events; so says our great Master 
(Dignaga) : .. It is a simultaneous conditioning factor bee .. 
sause of invariable concomitance". Now, on this point the 
following is pointed out: The Rationalists do not proclaim 
that causation is mere Tatbhliva-bh'tivin, 'presence of the 
effect on the presence of cause'. That causation is geared 
up' with .the . succession of time and never bereft of it. 
This is pointed out in the following: 
"The causation-characteristic freed from the 1ime-su('ce-
ssi<'n is not permissible between the cow and the horse; 
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the same is the case with the events of time-succession, 
or the simultaneous moment-events of a flux of elements 
with the other flux of elements. Therefore amongst things 
which are already previously present a thing is regarded 
as effect of that thing from which it is produced as in the 
case of pot that is produced in the presence of colour, etc." 
(note this illustration from the opponent's point of view). 
The said example of lamp and light for simultaneous 
causation is unproved; to this effect the following is poin-
ted out: 
"The example of lamp and light, etc. to prove the 
simultaneous causation has been stated; even in this case 
there is a very subtle time-distinction. The illusion of simu-
ltaneity there is due to the time-distinction hardly discernible 
(du1'lak~a) as' in the case of a sharp pin piercing through 
several ' hundred of lotus-petals (padmapatra-sata-vedha)" 
••....... This rejection of causation through the process of 
simultaneity is also applicable to the knowledge and its part 
and their graspability and grasping agency; so is said further: 
"The rejection of causation by simultaneity is equally 
applicable to the parts (knowledge and its part)". (see Ibid.) 
As to Dignaga's second alternative answer,viz. it be-
comes so in succession by transmitting the force (Salrti) 
the same critic continues: Between two successive events 
the previous may be graspable by the other. It iscriti-
cised previously that what is past cannot become graspable, 
this criticism is not valid; for, it is/possible by trans-
mitting its force. The' self-form of knowledge on account 
of impression (v/isa'f/a) imposed by a previous knowledge 
(upon itself) is produced subsequently. (This means that) 
lilambana is similar to memory (.9mrUan'l:m iva, -;nrlmbr.ma). 
Here also KumarHa says. "Alambana is not possible by 
succession through the door of transmitting the force" Vbid. 
pp. 311-312). 
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1he above elaboration of the opponent's criticism is 
aimed at to acquaint ourselves with a clear understanding 
of the author's complicated proposition. 
Dharmakirti being one of the strongest champions of 
this school" hi~ conclusiv~ remark may also be recorded 
In brief which appears as an echo of Dignaga's view: 
;; 
How and by' what means do these atoms transform 
our consciousness as reflex of a gross form? (Pra. Var. II. 
321). Therefore one consciousness has two aspects (graspable 
and grasper) andexpetienced and memorised; the realization 
of this in double aspect is regarded the fruit. (Ibid. 337). 
The self of the Knowledge though indivisible in truth is 
noticed (i.e. experienced) as though it is divided into graspable 
and grasper on account of our perverted visions (IbId. 354). 
In order to satisfy the scriptural declaration that' the 
visual con sci ousness emerges on the basis of the eye and 
is visible the author states: "The sense-organ, (i.e. eye, etc) 
is only a sort of dbkti, force as it acts as auxilliary to 
its objectivity". The. sense-organ is inferred to be only 
a force of consciousness, but not material in character. 
It may be a non-contradictory part of consciousness or it 
may be in its own indescribable self. There can be no 
difference in the production of its result. Thus the objective 
aspect and the force of sense-organ go on mutually conditioned 
from immemorial time". 
The author's statement about the seri~e-organ as of the 
indescribable is suggestive. It shows that he does not side 
with the Vaibhasikas for whom the senses are material, but 
with some early scripture according to which they are other 
than the visible etc; and supra-sensous and inferable from the 
sensory consciousness and seated on the eye-ball, etc. (v. Yaso-
mitra's comm. Kosa, I, p. 24-25). ]!)harmakirti too holds the 
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same view, v. Pra. Vartika II, 48 a-b: They are transcendent.ll 
and designated as senses ... Refer to Vinitadeva's con 
ment for other opinions on the senses (p. 92 telow). 
The author's explanatory part of his last aphoris:n is 
very we1l elucidated by Vinitadeva in his Tika, one mny 
read my summalY in English, PP33- ~below. 
NOTES 3v 
I. The early Buddhists plead that the atoms though 
too subtle and imperceptible, serve as a hidden cause of 
our knowledge, because their gro:.s fOI ms that we experience 
are phenomenal and cannot be rer arded as either different 
from 0[" identical with the aloms, is not at all counted as 
a cause. The same principle holds good in the Buddhists' 
denial of the soul theory. The soul is not something real 
apart from its several parts, cfr. ~am. Nikaya, 1,135, the 
saymg: 1.1".lT <lT1f ~'ilTUer 'l1<fra 1/TQ~T ",,;;rf1 I ••.••• 
tJ:ef f'fjrtl'.! ~i'f~<f 'l1<ff.,. .qr~a f'f'lfa: I 
Cited in Satya - Siddhi, Ch. 38, p. 190. 
The above position of the early Buddhists renders much 
easier the task of Dignaga of rejecting the combined atom-
object proposition (i.e. his second one). However lh~ 
Sautrantikas assign some reality to it on the score that 
it discharges a purposive action. See discussion on this 
topic below. 
2. See Tattvas Panjika (p. 556 ) mentioning such three 
opinions: 1) Atoms get combined on~ another (Samyujvant;! 
parcmii'fJal'c.~,), 2 ) they always appear with some intcrspa":.::, 
but do not corne into a mutual (Or1t2.ct (Santara (Va rit) ([']1 
na sprsanti,) 3) when they aprear without interspace, we call 
them combined (nirantaratve tu sprstasamjna-). Similar three 
views are noticeable in Abhis, Aloka, ( p. 372-74 ) : I (Sang-
hata-paksa, view of the (ambiLed atoms, 2) Santara-pariv-
arapaksa, view of atoms encircled with interspace, 3) nirantara-
parivarapak.'}u, view of the same without interspace. These 
three are termed knowable categories (Jneya-pak.;::;a): 
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According to Th. Stcherbatsky's finding the combined ; 
atoms alone appear in phenomenal reality. Simple ones or 
infra-atomic elements presumably were relegated to a trans-
cendental rea1ity ...... (v. Conception of Buddhism, p. 12). 
2a. Kue-chi's interpretation of Vasubandhu's verse 11 
in the Vimsika as referring to four views: 1) " eka-paksa" 
of the Vaisesikas, 2) anekapJksa of the old Sarvastivadin, 
3) Paramanupak§a of the Sutra-sect and 4) Samghata-pak§a of 
the Neo-Sarvastivadin (Nyayanusara) is not admissible and 
it is quite opposed to Vasubandhu's own comment. (v. his 
comment on the vimsika-vijnapti-chinese, Fas. III p. 2 ). 
Vasubandhu refers to the three views on]y, viz. 1 ) the view 
of the Vaisesika, 2) the view of the Sarvastivadin as atom-
object and 3 ) the view of the Sautrantika holding the integr-
ated-atom-object ( Sarnhala-a!lu ) 
3. ~f~i"f: ~~~11I: ~ ~illl;:q' i:l~ 'fT!lierr: , 
~p:n;;~f1r~llff"<t f'i"f,~i':f'lI~qC;lj'a- II !:j>lT\1f'nFFf~ I r. 19·i. 
'If'a': t ;;'% flPiICfT"f+:q;;I; q~f'f~IH~llfT ~fo fq~F(f: I i"f'1r;r!j1t~-
\if;:~tq f<fr~f ~~IlI"lf'TT'"f<: ~fi"f 'ilTw:r. (sr>lP1ml1;;iflt) I i"flllr '"f q<:+:TT1l1rrt 
"11;"1'.1': (note 'iqWOi{T~<::!lC;lO::r~::CT1) ~f~if 'll:~~a- I ~ ~ '"f ~1+:TT;:lr 
+:Ti"f: I <'PT '"f ~/l::rr;:!t :;r~':f~m-:3fhr::r 1 l1TIlI;!f<!f;[a;rr'i':q' fi:f"li~q;;r~<istra- 3T1?frd I 
1'(;;- Cfi"llT;<f'fi~t TfJ]'~~lfa 1 3J;rTF[- . 
3p:rr;:(l<:1f"·HP:;r;t:I'li:l' "1T1l;a- ltSllT'IrSqt , 
~ffirfi't ;Qf"ifi"fp,~ fQ f.,fl1~ ~T,:;t1fn:lrr: II Ihid 195. 
~fB: I ...... lrSllT<.fT t1fTtr~ a uf.o;rnf ::jQil: ~P.ai'fH'P:<rifl: q~fq~Trr~Tl:I'r 
~7l:fr<fr I ~r;;t1f;+:Trr t:J;Cf fg f'1f~B'I!ffiT: "a~Ii'r1j;r.q;;r;:lf('qTq" 1{(,'ilf~i{r Ii 
3Tllr;;r U flffi1'rr-l'lIJ i1Ti5tupq<::T;;ur;; I 
ait~Tf;;lj'trri;( ~T'l~tti' mlli;:l:I'T)'"f~:' II IbilI 196 
9.f~: I arur;;t U iTT;;:3f.,.,UI ij~<ffq~: ............ 1 ;;f~ $f~lrCfi+:T1lfq)?' l:I'T: I 
.- ~. ~ 
fCfi;:ry; ~f~ar t:J;q ai;( i:l'tIlTi;( t:J;<fift>l'l. q<::l=fTIlT1 ~r;;f1i fifl:l'tfTi;( UfI11,l:(ITT"l": 
Uf"\\i?T'HQl11!'fWmf-':.f"-l'cf :rfr"f11;1f;f ar:rqrf~rrT 1 if?; q~::rflJ:rf:1f{ffi'1rllt;:::r f'i"l'lf':, I 
i:l'i;( <f,q mqrrlTfil"l;P:I<:ern:f \1f-H~Fqsrff'W: I 
The same idea in Chapter I, 88 90. 
4 ;rr ~~ar'fflr ~r~l:I'~,* (lfl(ff <l>nf"l~qf"{<f,~'tq~) '!'T(Fijf;.q;;)t<f m;;lf':~'!i' 
ry; ~!~lffq(l('1 "t~9'i 'l1f;;{l:lf"flfff 6l'i:l' arr~-
'A;:lf);lff~a1,;;ni;( '!'TQverrfq;;r;:I1R I 
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q1'iip:r~Cf;;flf;;.~~et f~<rTar;rl:ar;~"Tq: I 
ar;f<1J1(~ 'lTCf?rt ~r~(f~:;r11: I ulif11u '<fli'rrY;;rrf."ttiff'i{-I1i1T 
~r4ar;H1Jfl,"'TCfPtrCfrq: ., m~;::r~r~'fi~q+r! (p. 301-1) 
"1 a~r'l'+nqJ01:nfll"'IH t!;1.f 'fi1<:bt)t~1Jf~eTllfl! I o:;;:q ~f(tn';jFIJ­
;:ft'{fq f'Rl'?r t!;Cf ! l:T~rs"ir- sr~rrrrl~'5l:Tf'IT;:nf<:~CfK! ~~ ~f?r I ?r'lft~-
?r~rq"Trf~ml1r:;t ~~;f;;fCf CfarEr I 
'11<riqTff"lfl1~ffi' (f~f\!f'l1!fCf~ fJRiTe1uf ;;~ ~f;;;fli'ffifl1f~ I '1~r 
qj~h<Tfi'il:Tl1~fqql.f~~ {q"eTuf tf frriJl1<:fi:?ff ;;Tf'T Cfj~lqlhfi'lff o~T ;;11T<rfcr-
llT<lICf<T f<rfif,!9'ff ~ 1<f'1iH1Jf;;j' e1crr't I 
lJ CfIi>J~ <:r~r "Tf~a 4TCfN~ ~ fCf cr9"~r If 
TTq;;:'ilTlfl1T~'~fll ~;?r;:lFcn::i3f !.ff1lT I 
~Cflfc:,,! '<12: 1:IiRf ?r~111a:. ,!<iI1<rf~~a II 
7.lT l1"l'Il'Tq: ;jfl<:r~ Cflli1fq ~;:,~ar;r:<TrQ;:frt~a- I 
", ' 
<:rU< qt<e-~lffq qT",fll~ 'fil<far;T<;lTR"CffI1Clf'lf f~;g~')Cf$f'ITTqf;;fi1 f.,;;11Trrll. I 
?r~fl'frlqClfr~-
g~~~11Rt f'1;~{ tlj;'w~rf.,~lif<ill. I 
lv:pn'Tsr'ITf~n=: ~.!'i11: <f,l~T\nq 6'lf '1: II 
'fiq flfi{ llT1Tq'~Tf~l1r.,T~q 
$#'al~<! l:T<1T q<qq"lllT~ q?H I 
;J:f;:q+rf!J'fiI{q"~C:l1fa~j~':l:nq V;;r~llfCJt q<qCf'lf!ITi'folffi1~G ~<r 
lfTf(Cfmf'r: I ~~Ti'i~.,);.,q"QT;~" fl1~: ar;TlI'fiT<:lTR"F-i'!:!:, \3'"'l1lf)~iifi<liJ11Jf~,nf<;f'i I 
~'T"'iJ llT'I'Tifr., ':ji'Tll '\'if"{lJ'R"Cfr.,'{rfOfilTl ~r.,f!IT,rt~f.l' 
Cfffiam<:Piif -
'IT! rr:q Ttl r '1'lw., ;:'l~~ q ~lfrf;;;;< tf"fil:Tr I 
t.Tf ~mqq~ 1 "fi+rlTTf'i["Y~f! ~:<i'lJn-{fl:f ~H?i ~ I 1I~ 
;;r;ftqH ~Ti?:'i1~ <=t. ~nrGla"T~'i"ffi+[, q'q ar~, !ITu-:rrq.1Jf~rt1Jf ~''l1CfTq: I 
~ofmiiTfq;:p.lm.,r\!filt., fi?: ~~q~q1f1<:~~'T'crI1T;:f 'l1arf, I ~+r~1Jffl1<rr<:;!f;Ofi'i+[ 1 Cf~ff,1'[--' 
1iTffi'lQ1Jf1q ':f.rllf~f?r I o?J"iq--
(Slokavar. pp, 311-12) 
The above criticism proves that in pleading for a simu1ta-
neous causality Dignaga might have employed the Lamp-
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and-light-example, but we miss it in the translations of the 
Alambanapariksa. Vinitadeva employs it in some other 
context, viz. self-affecting-action (atmani kriya). It is the 
Sarvastivadin who first pleaded for the simultaneous causa-
tion with the same example; cfr. Poussin,Kosa, II, p.253; 
vyakhya ad II. 51. cal. edn. p, 123; Kosabhasya p. 84-85). 
5. fI<f.:ltffrI eFt.,. .,'<t;'1T+Trl,f~ ~"ll"]Cf: I 321. 
ffPnf[tii'1 ~P:~bF f{~Cf~ :=!-.:r.J.l~ I 
~D<I~ 'ql~t1191~f~rp.:r 'r~~;:f l:f.<.1"1, II 337. 
3Tfcf'li1lTlsfq ,!;['lI(!:Ir fi:Tq<lTf~d;:r!1f;f: I 
lJr~'lIXT~if;fI'fqf~~·G:;nf.,q ~9.'Jf~ II 354. 
Vijnaptimatrata in Pramana Val'. 11, 320·371. 
DIGNAGA'S VERSES (KARIKA) 
] . Though atoms serve as cause of our sensory 
consciousness they ar~ not its actual object like the sense-
organs; because the consciousness dtles not represent the 
image of the atoms. 
2. Con~ciousness does not arise from what is represented 
in it, because it does not exist in substance like the double-
moon. Thus both the external things are unfit to be real 
objects of consciousness. 
3. Some masters hold that the integrated form of atoms 
(sancitakara) is the cause of com:ciousness. The author 
replies: The. atomic form does not become the content 
of consciousness e.g. the solidity, etc. 
4. In that case the different perceptions of the pot, 
the bowl, etc. will be identical. 
If the perception differs in accordance with the different 
forms of the pot and others, they never exist in the substantial 
atoms. 
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5. Their dimensions are difierent and therefore they are 
related to substantially non-existent things. For, if we remove 
the atoms one by one the perception illuminating the image 
of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away. 
6. It is the object (artha) whieh exists internally in 
the knowledge itself as a knowable aspect which appears 
to us as if it exists externally. 
Because that object is essentially in the nature of consci-
ousness and because it acts a" the condition (to the 
consciousness) the knowable aspect is the object. 
7a-b. Though it is only a part of the consciousness, 
it becomes condition to the latter because it is invariably 
and simultaneously associated with the latter. 
Or it becomes condition also in succession by transmitting 
the force (sakti). 
7c-d. What is the sense-organ is (nothing but) the 
force itself in consciousness by, virtue of its acting as 
an auxiliary (sahakarin) to its objectivity. 
8. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness. 
Thus the objective aspect (visayarupa) of consciousness and 
the force (fakU) called sense-organ go mutually conditioned 
from immemorial time. 
SUMMARY OF THE TIKA BY VINITADEVA 
The author Dignaga presents the first disputant's proposi-
tion by stating: Those who ... 
In this sentence the topics to be discarded are expressed. 
The opponents' perverse reasons are expressed in the sentence: 
"Because the atoms are cause of consciousnessw and because 
the aggregates are productive of their image--bearing 
consciousness", 
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